Secure Deliveries with
Verified and Trustworthy Drivers

DriverTrust is an advanced yet user-friendly solution designed to enhance asset security and streamline efficiency in delivery and logistics operations. It features an intuitive driver app for effortless driver verification, paired with a straightforward web portal that simplifies cross-company evaluations and automates tasks, ensuring seamless monitoring and management of operations.

Yes, DriverTrust is designed to integrate seamlessly with existing company systems. By leveraging modern APIs and flexible architecture, DriverTrust can connect to your current tools and platforms, ensuring smooth data flow and minimal disruption to your operations.

By preventing theft, DriverTrust reduces losses and associated costs. Additionally, its streamlined and automated processes save time, leading to increased efficiency and cost savings.

By performing thorough identity verification, maintaining a cross-company driver status database, and minimizing risks associated with falsified driver credentials.

Yes, DriverTrust is designed to work on a wide range of smartphones, including older models, making it accessible for all drivers.

DriverTrust uses a traffic light system for cross company evaluation. The traffic light status is generated based on different weighted factors such as Fraud detection, Document validity, House & Yard Ban, Blacklist Checks and Upload time adherence. The data is gathered from the DriverTrust web platform and entered house & yard bans as well as the DriverTrust App which uses thorough fraud prevention with hundreds of checks performed in a few seconds in a simple workflow that is partly based on the leading verification services, blacklists, industry cross-links, risk levels, fraud agent interference, and biometric encodings to ensure GDPR compliance.

Yes. The DriverTrust app gives drivers direct access to their traffic light status and verification status.

The platform includes a transparent dispute resolution mechanism for drivers. If you wish to learn more about this, please feel free to contact us.

DriverTrust has advanced data protection technology in place that ensures data security and GDPR compliance, besides its contractual setup. Data exchange and storage are based on different contracts that are established when using the solution between the involved parties. If you wish to learn more about this, please feel free to contact us.

FOGD means Fraudulently Obtained Genuine Documents. The term refers to genuine, officially issued documents that were obtained on a fraudulent basis. Such documents may be technically genuine, contain authentic security features and still be based on a false or manipulated identity foundation. Interpol expressly distinguishes, in the area of identity and travel document fraud, between false documents and genuine documents that are misused or obtained fraudulently. FOGD is therefore not limited to one specific industry. It is relevant wherever identity determines access, trust, eligibility or authorization. (https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Counterfeit-currency-and-security-documents/Identity-and-travel-document-fraud)

Fraudulently obtained genuine documents are particularly dangerous because the document itself can be formally genuine. In classic forgery cases, the defect is often visible in the document itself, for example in a counterfeit passport, an altered data page or a non recognized pseudo document. In FOGD cases, the problem usually lies earlier in the issuance process. A public authority may have issued a genuine document, but on the basis of manipulated identity evidence, false source data or other deceptive input. This is precisely why FOGD can pass even high quality document checks. (https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Counterfeit-currency-and-security-documents/Identity-and-travel-document-fraud)

Forged documents are not genuine, have been altered or are not officially recognized. FOGD, by contrast, refers to genuine documents that were obtained through deception. The fraud does not necessarily lie in the document itself. It lies in the fact that the genuine document was issued on the basis of a fraudulent identity foundation. Interpol lists relevant categories including counterfeits, forgeries, pseudo documents, the misuse of genuine documents by impostors and fraudulently obtained genuine documents. (https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Counterfeit-currency-and-security-documents/Identity-and-travel-document-fraud)

A normal document check mainly verifies whether a document appears genuine, whether security features are present and whether the presenting person matches the document. In a FOGD case, all of this may be true. The document may be genuine, the chip may be genuine, the security features may be genuine and the biometric comparison may return a positive result. Nevertheless, the underlying identity may have been established on a fraudulent basis. ICAO points out that the processes used to establish and verify a person’s identity can often be weaker than the security of the document issued later. (https://www.icao.int/sites/default/files/TRIP/Publications/ICAO-Guide-on-Evidence-of-Identity.pdf)

FOGD can create security risks wherever a genuine document creates trust. This includes, for example, logistics, transport, staffing, platform work, financial services, telecommunications, insurance, building security, access to critical infrastructure, healthcare, public authority processes, online accounts, payment processes and any form of Know Your Customer or Know Your Worker verification. Logistics is one particularly clear example because drivers, service providers, contractors and external personnel may gain access to goods, sites and sensitive process information. However, the underlying problem is cross sectoral: fraudulently obtained genuine documents can make a false or manipulated identity appear legitimate. (https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Counterfeit-currency-and-security-documents/Identity-and-travel-document-fraud)

FOGD is relevant for companies because criminal actors do not only attack from the outside. They may also present themselves as legitimate employees, service providers, contractors, customers, drivers, platform users or authorized personnel. If a person presents a genuine document that was obtained fraudulently, that person may gain access to goods, buildings, data, systems, payments, confidential information or security critical processes. FOGD therefore creates risks for insider crime, identity fraud, multiple identities, social engineering and trust based access processes. (https://www.cisa.gov/topics/physical-security/insider-threat-mitigation)

Protection against FOGD is important because in many industries a person’s identity determines operational privileges. People may gain access to buildings, goods, IT systems, customer data, financial processes, sensitive information or security critical work areas. If a fraudulently obtained genuine document is accepted without detecting the underlying identity risk, a person may appear formally legitimate even though the identity foundation is false or manipulated. This creates a security gap between document authenticity and actual trustworthiness. CISA describes insider risks generally as threats involving persons who have authorized access to, or knowledge of, an organization’s resources. (https://www.cisa.gov/topics/physical-security/insider-threat-mitigation)

Logistics shows very clearly why FOGD is practically relevant, but it is only one example. Drivers, contractors, service providers and external personnel may assume operational key roles, collect goods, enter sites, view shipment data or trigger security processes. In Fake Carrier scenarios, criminal actors may also exploit apparently legitimate identities, documents or company related structures to obtain access to shipments or transport processes. If a fraudulently obtained genuine document is used in such an environment, it can create a false sense of security: the document appears genuine, the person appears authorized and the identity risk remains hidden. Comparable risks exist wherever internal or external persons gain access to sensitive resources. (https://www.cisa.gov/topics/information-communications-technology-supply-chain-security)

A biometric 1:1 check verifies whether a person matches one specific document or one specific data record. It does not automatically verify whether the same natural person has already been registered under a different identity. This is critical in FOGD cases because the person may match the fraudulently obtained genuine document, while still using a manipulated identity foundation. NIST describes biometric verification as a 1:1 comparison and distinguishes it from 1:n identification or deduplication against a larger data set. (https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63a/ial/)

Protection against FOGD requires more than the verification of one isolated identity. The decisive question is whether the same natural person has already appeared under different identity data, with different documents or in another organizational context. Only a continuous 1:n comparison can make multiple identities, repeated registration attempts and identity changes visible. The World Bank describes deduplication as a central mechanism for detecting multiple registrations in identity systems. (https://id4d.worldbank.org/guide/biometric-data)

FOGD and multiple identities are closely connected. A person may use genuine documents obtained fraudulently to build several formally plausible identities. Each individual identity may appear unremarkable when checked in isolation. The actual risk arises when the same natural person appears multiple times in a system or network and is still not recognized as the same person. Interpol describes identity and document fraud as a phenomenon in which both false and genuine documents can be used fraudulently. (https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Counterfeit-currency-and-security-documents/Identity-and-travel-document-fraud)

Stolen documents can sometimes be identified through loss reports, watchlists or databases. In FOGD cases, by contrast, there is often no stolen document. The document was issued by a genuine authority and is formally valid. Therefore, FOGD cannot be detected merely by asking whether a document is genuine, stolen or expired. The relevant risk lies in how the document was obtained and whether the identity behind it is reliable. (https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Counterfeit-currency-and-security-documents/Identity-and-travel-document-fraud)

Breeder documents are source documents used to establish or support an identity, such as birth certificates or evidence of origin. If such source documents are forged or manipulated, they can later be used to obtain a genuine identity document. This creates a FOGD risk because the later document may be technically genuine even though the identity foundation is false. ICAO points out that the processes used to establish and verify identity can often be weaker than the security of the document issued later. (https://www.icao.int/sites/default/files/TRIP/Publications/ICAO-Guide-on-Evidence-of-Identity.pdf)

A secure passport protects against many forms of classic document forgery. However, it does not fully protect against the possibility that the passport was issued on the basis of false identity information. With FOGD, the problem is not the passport as a technical document. The problem is the identity that led to its issuance. FOGD must therefore be understood as an identity and issuance problem, not only as a document problem. ICAO expressly describes the need to reliably establish the applicant’s identity in the secure issuance of travel documents. (https://www.icao.int/sites/default/files/TRIP/Publications/Guide-PART-1-Format-Revised-27March.SM.pdf)

Protection against FOGD is particularly relevant when external persons gain access to internal processes, customer data, goods, buildings, systems or confidential information. Modern value chains often rely on service providers, contractors, subcontractors and changing external personnel. If such a person presents a genuine document obtained fraudulently, that person may appear trustworthy even though the underlying identity is not reliable. CISA describes modern organizational environments as networks of third party vendors, suppliers, service providers and contractors, which increases the importance of robust identity and access controls. (https://www.cisa.gov/topics/information-communications-technology-supply-chain-security)

Corporate screening mainly checks companies, licenses, register data, insurance coverage, certificates or commercial plausibility. FOGD, however, concerns the natural person who actually gains access to resources, processes or sensitive information. A company may appear formally unremarkable while individual persons act with multiple identities or genuine documents obtained fraudulently. Protection against FOGD must therefore also operate at the person level. (https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Counterfeit-currency-and-security-documents/Identity-and-travel-document-fraud)

KYC checks can verify document authenticity, liveness and 1:1 matching. However, they do not automatically answer the question of whether the same person is already known under another identity in a larger network. For protection against FOGD, a one time KYC check is therefore not sufficient if there is no continuous 1:n comparison and no linked assessment of security relevant findings. NIST distinguishes between 1:1 verification and biometric identification against a larger data set. (https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2021/10/25/nist_appendix_pact_nov02.pdf)

Protection against FOGD requires more transparency about identities, repeated registrations and security relevant anomalies. At the same time, personal data, especially biometric data, must be strictly protected. The challenge is therefore to reduce FOGD risks effectively without unlawful blacklist sharing, unnecessary data collection or uncontrolled disclosure of sensitive information. The GDPR requires, among other things, data minimization, purpose limitation and appropriate technical and organizational measures. (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679)

Unlawful blacklist sharing is legally risky and does not solve the technical FOGD problem. A list of names is of limited use if criminal actors reappear with different identities, formally genuine documents or changed registration data. Protection against FOGD therefore requires more than a simple list of names. It requires a privacy compliant, status based and technically robust way to recognize the same natural person. Data protection authorities have identified serious legal problems with fraud blacklists lacking a sufficient statutory basis. (https://www.edpb.europa.eu/news/national-news/2022/tax-administration-fined-fraud-black-list_en)

FOGD detection in DriverTrust means that the system does not only check one individual document. The decisive question is whether the same natural person appears again with different identity data, different documents or in different organizational contexts. DriverTrust addresses FOGD through a combination of multi layer verification, continuous recognition, 1:n comparison, Trust Indication and a privacy compliant status logic. The technical basis for this approach is the distinction between isolated 1:1 verification and dataset based 1:n recognition. (https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2021/10/25/nist_appendix_pact_nov02.pdf)

A normal document check mainly looks at the document. DriverTrust also considers the person, the context, repeated registrations, security relevant status information and the question of whether an identity is merely formally plausible or also consistent within a wider network. In this way, DriverTrust addresses the central weakness of classic checks in FOGD cases: the gap between document authenticity and genuine identity assurance. Interpol expressly describes FOGD as a category of genuine documents obtained fraudulently. (https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Counterfeit-currency-and-security-documents/Identity-and-travel-document-fraud)

FOGD risks do not arise only during initial onboarding. People may later present new documents, register again, change employer, use a new service provider or re enter sensitive processes through another access point. Protection against FOGD must therefore be continuous. Continuous revalidation helps ensure that identity, document and compliance risks are not checked only once, but throughout the relevant period of use. This reflects the principle that identity systems need reliable mechanisms for deduplication and ongoing integrity protection. (https://id4d.worldbank.org/guide/biometric-data)

Where valuable goods, sensitive data and critical processes are involved, a single wrong decision can cause substantial damage. If a person using a fraudulently obtained genuine document gains access to assets, customer data, IT systems, confidential information or security critical areas, the potential harm can be significant. In such environments, it is not sufficient to check only whether a document is formally genuine. An additional security layer at the person level is required. CISA emphasizes in the context of insider risks that persons with authorized access can cause significant harm. (https://www.cisa.gov/topics/physical-security/insider-threat-mitigation)

FOGD is equally relevant outside logistics because many sectors rely on identity documents. In banking, genuine documents obtained fraudulently may be used to open accounts or bypass KYC processes. In telecommunications and platform environments, they may be used to create false user or merchant accounts. In insurance, they may be relevant in policy, claims or benefit processes. In companies, they may be used for applications, access permissions or service provider onboarding. The pattern is always the same: a genuine document creates trust, even though it was obtained fraudulently. (https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Counterfeit-currency-and-security-documents/Identity-and-travel-document-fraud)

Fraud prevention is the broader category. FOGD detection is a specific and particularly demanding part of it. It focuses on genuine documents obtained fraudulently and on the underlying identity deception. While classic fraud prevention often looks for suspicious documents, known names or known risks, FOGD detection must also be able to assess identities that appear formally unremarkable. (https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Counterfeit-currency-and-security-documents/Identity-and-travel-document-fraud)

Protection against FOGD cannot rely on a single verification step. In the context of document and identity fraud, Frontex emphasizes that an integrated approach is required. For companies, this means that document checks, biometric assurance, 1:n comparison, revalidation, status logic, compliance processes and privacy architecture must work together. (https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/an-integrated-approach-to-combat-document-and-identity-fraud-29m6RJ)

FOGD is a security gap that often remains invisible in classic control processes. Companies that rely only on document authenticity, corporate screening or one time identity verification may overlook genuine documents that were obtained fraudulently. Companies seeking to reduce insider risks, identity fraud, multiple identities and unauthorized access to sensitive resources should therefore explicitly include protection against FOGD in their security strategy. CISA describes insider risks and risks in interconnected supplier and service provider structures as security relevant issues for organizations. (https://www.cisa.gov/topics/physical-security/insider-threat-mitigation)

DriverTrust was developed for precisely the security gap created by FOGD, multiple identities, insider risks, Fake Carrier scenarios and cross organizational access structures. The solution combines person verification, continuous recognition, cross organizational status logic, automated revalidation and privacy friendly implementation. As a result, DriverTrust does not only address the question of whether a document is genuine. It also addresses whether the person using it can be reliably assessed in a security relevant context. This approach is particularly easy to understand in logistics, where FOGD can interact with insider risks and Fake Carrier methods, but it applies in principle to all industries in which identity determines access, trust, eligibility or authorization. (https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/an-integrated-approach-to-combat-document-and-identity-fraud-29m6RJ)

Fraudulently obtained genuine documents are part of a large and serious identity fraud problem. Public authorities do not always publish FOGD as a separate statistical category, because many cases are recorded under broader labels such as document fraud, identity fraud, immigration fraud, application fraud or KYC fraud. However, this does not make FOGD a marginal risk. On the contrary, it makes FOGD especially dangerous: if a genuine document was obtained fraudulently and still passes authenticity checks, the fraud may remain hidden.

Frontex reported that in 2023 alone, EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries detected 17,424 fraudsters using or possessing 22,395 fraudulent documents at the EU’s external borders. Frontex also describes document and identity fraud as instrumental for a wide range of criminal activities. These figures show that document and identity fraud is not an isolated phenomenon, but a large scale security challenge. (https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/an-integrated-approach-to-combat-document-and-identity-fraud-29m6RJ)

FOGD is a recognized and particularly dangerous part of this threat landscape. Interpol expressly states that criminals and terrorists often make fraudulent use of both fake and genuine identity and travel documents, and it lists fraudulently obtained genuine documents as a separate category of document fraud. This means that FOGD is not a theoretical edge case. It is a known method used by criminal actors to make a false or manipulated identity appear legitimate. (https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Counterfeit-currency-and-security-documents/Identity-and-travel-document-fraud)

Yes. There is strong evidence that fraudulently obtained genuine documents are used at scale, even if many official statistics aggregate them with broader document and identity fraud categories. A white paper by ITW Security Division on fraudulently obtained genuine travel documents states that the number of such documents in existence is believed to be greater than the number of falsified or counterfeit documents. The same paper cites estimates that, in France, between 500,000 and 1,000,000 of 6,500,000 biometric passports in circulation may have been obtained on the basis of false breeder documents. It also cites estimates that 5 to 7 percent of Greek passports may have been issued on the basis of non genuine identity cards or birth certificates. (https://www.itwsf.com/Portals/0/Documents/White-Papers/Fraudulently%20Obtain%20Genuine%20FOG%20Documents.pdf)

These figures show the scale of the issue: FOGD can affect even highly secure biometric travel documents. This is precisely why traditional document authenticity checks are not enough. A fraudulently obtained genuine document may be real, valid and technically correct. The fraud sits behind the document, in the identity foundation that led to its issuance.

Yes. The broader document and identity fraud environment is becoming more serious and more sophisticated, and this directly increases the need for protection against FOGD. FOGD is one of the most difficult forms of this problem because it can survive normal document checks.

Frontex reported that in 2022 the number of fraudulent documents reported within the European Union Document Fraud Risk Analysis Network increased by 5 percent compared with 2021. In the same report, Frontex stated that passports became the most reported fraudulent document type in 2022, with an increase of 35 percent compared with 2021, and that detections of fraudulent visas more than doubled, partly due to counterfeit and fraudulently obtained short term visas. Frontex also warned that forgers are increasing their mastery of printing and identity fraud technologies, making detection during border checks more complex. (https://prd.frontex.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/ara-2023-pv-web-version-2.pdf)

Interpol also treats fraudulently obtained genuine documents as an active threat vector. Its Project Identity states that criminals and terrorists use several means to conceal their identity, including fake documents, fraudulently obtained genuine documents and morphing photos to create fake identity documents. (https://www.interpol.int/How-we-work/Forensics/Project-IDENTITY)

The conclusion is clear: document and identity fraud is a high volume and increasingly sophisticated threat. FOGD is among the most dangerous forms of this threat because the document itself may be genuine. Companies that rely only on document authenticity, one time KYC checks or corporate screening remain exposed to this risk.

The FOGD problem is likely underestimated because FOGD is difficult to detect by design. A fraudulently obtained genuine document may pass authenticity checks because it was issued by a real authority and contains genuine security features. If the underlying identity fraud is not discovered, the case may never be recorded as FOGD.

This is why FOGD is particularly dangerous for companies. A low number of publicly labelled FOGD cases does not mean the risk is low. It can also mean that existing systems are not designed to distinguish between document authenticity and identity reliability. ICAO has emphasized that the processes used to establish and verify identity can often be weaker than the security of the document issued later. (https://www.icao.int/sites/default/files/TRIP/Publications/ICAO-Guide-on-Evidence-of-Identity.pdf)

In practical terms, this means that companies may accept a document as genuine while still failing to detect that the identity behind it was created or manipulated fraudulently. This is exactly the protection gap that makes dedicated protection against FOGD urgently necessary.

Companies urgently need protection against FOGD because criminal actors can use genuine documents obtained fraudulently to appear legitimate. This can allow them to access goods, buildings, IT systems, customer data, financial processes, platform accounts, sensitive infrastructure or security critical operations. The risk is especially clear in logistics and transport, where Fake Carrier scenarios, insider risks and external personnel can create direct access to valuable goods and operational information. But the same logic applies across many other sectors, including staffing, platform work, financial services, telecommunications, insurance, access control and critical infrastructure.

Traditional document checks are not enough because FOGD can make a false or manipulated identity appear formally legitimate. One time KYC checks are not enough because they usually verify one identity at one point in time. Corporate screening is not enough because FOGD concerns the natural person who gains access to resources, not only the company around that person.

Protection against FOGD therefore requires an additional identity security layer: multi layer verification, recognition of repeated or multiple identities, continuous revalidation, privacy compliant status logic and a legally robust governance model. This is the type of protection gap DriverTrust is designed to address.

DriverTrust helps solve the FOGD problem by adding an identity security layer behind the document. In a FOGD case, the document may be genuine, valid and technically unremarkable, while the identity behind it was established fraudulently. DriverTrust addresses this gap by focusing on the person using the document, the consistency of identity signals and the security relevant context in which access, trust or eligibility is requested.

According to our current knowledge, DriverTrust is the only solution that is specifically designed to detect and address FOGD risks in this way. The solution combines multi layer identity verification, continuous recognition of the same natural person, cross organizational status logic, automated revalidation and privacy friendly implementation. This enables DriverTrust to assess whether a person presenting a formally genuine document can be reliably evaluated in the relevant security context.

DriverTrust is operated by Green Convenience GmbH. Green Convenience GmbH has successfully completed the PCT patent procedure and holds patent protected technology in 156 countries. Unique data protection technology, dedicated privacy first developers and a network of law firms that continuously check DriverTrust form the foundation behind DriverTrust’s ability to address FOGD, multiple identities and identity based circumvention risks across organizational contexts.

DriverTrust follows a Privacy by Design approach with data minimization, limited visibility of sensitive information and status based evaluation. The permanent storage of image data that is not required for the ongoing purpose is avoided for privacy reasons. This strengthens both security and data protection because sensitive raw data is reduced while the necessary security assessment remains operationally usable. The GDPR requires, among other things, data minimization, storage limitation, purpose limitation and appropriate technical and organizational measures. (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679)

DriverTrust is built on a structured contractual and governance setup. This is important because protection against FOGD involves legal bases, purpose definition, access rights, data minimization, retention logic, accountability and the handling of data subject rights. DriverTrust’s privacy architecture and contractual setup have been reviewed and further developed with specialized legal advisors, including Osborne Clarke.

DriverTrust addresses the identity risk behind the document. By combining identity verification, continuous recognition, privacy friendly status logic, data minimization, avoidance of unnecessary long term image storage, contractual governance, Privacy by Design and patent protected technology, DriverTrust reduces the structural gap that makes FOGD so difficult to detect with conventional document authenticity checks.